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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Many regarded the creation of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) in 2005 
as the culmination of the Caribbean’s long and protracted process toward final 
independence from its former colonizers. In the words of some insiders, it 
marked the “closing of the circle of independence”1 and the “sunset of British 
colonial rule.”2 Indeed, twelve member states of the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) quickly accepted the Court’s jurisdiction3 to interpret and apply 
the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) (2001), which formed the new 
Caribbean Single Market and Economy.4 Formally, the CCJ was thereby almost 
instantaneously empowered to hear cases involving Caribbean Community law 
(Community law). The CCJ was also empowered to replace the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in London—a last court of appeals for 
civil and criminal cases from the Caribbean and the most visible remnant of the 
British Empire’s former rule over the region. In regard to this jurisdiction, 
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 1.  DUKE E. POLLARD, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: CLOSING THE CIRCLE OF 
INDEPENDENCE 196 (2004). 
 2.  Leonard Birdsong, Formation of the Caribbean Court of Justice: The Sunset of British Colonial 
Rule in the English Speaking Caribbean,  36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 197, 227 (2004). 
 3.  More precisely, ten member states accepted the jurisdiction of the CCJ in 2001, and two 
additional states joined two years later. Although, full member states of CARICOM, the Bahamas and 
Haiti have not yet ratified the CCJ.  
 4. Derek O’Brien & Sonia Morano-Foadi, CARICOM and its Court of Justice, 37 COMMON L. 
WORLD REV. 334, 334 (2008). 
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however, the Court fared less well. To date only four Caribbean countries have 
accepted the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction: Guyana and Barbados in 2005, Belize 
in 2010, and Dominica in 2015. 
The CCJ’s unique double jurisdiction—original over Community law and 
appellate over other civil and criminal matters—underscores the complex 
sociopolitical context and transformation of which it is a part. Whereas the 
CCJ’s original jurisdiction over the RTC suggests a new, more judicialized 
approach to Caribbean integration, the Court’s appellate function is intended to 
repatriate to the Caribbean the development and control over the common law. 
This combination of globalization and latter-day decolonization is fundamental 
for understanding the Court’s authority. The legal distinction between original 
and appellate jurisdiction is often blurred during the heated debates 
surrounding the Court, in which the call for independence clashes with post-
colonial anxieties. These post-colonial anxieties are often articulated as 
concerns that a departure from the former imperial metropolis implies a 
farewell to the guarantees of a disinterested due process of law that has been an 
integral part of the fabric of social and political life since British conquest. 
These anxieties are compounded by the fear that giving up the legal recourse to 
the JCPC in London might trigger an exodus of foreign investment from the 
region.5 For precisely these reasons, discussions as diverse as Caribbean-specific 
sensitivities to capital punishment and sovereignty-intruding, cross-border tariff 
regulations have accompanied the Court’s operation since its inception in 2005. 
This construction of the CCJ at the crossroads of two different 
developments is central for the analysis of its authority and highlights the 
Court’s two relatively different constituencies and operational contexts. This 
article, however, argues that the CCJ’s growing authority has increasingly made 
the Court the institutional intersection for the convergence of these two 
different paths toward establishing the Caribbean as a legally integrated 
regional unity. This article’s analysis builds on qualitative interviews, conducted 
mainly in Trinidad & Tobago, Barbados, and Guyana. Empirical fieldwork used 
reflexive sociology to explore the broader socio-legal space that has emerged 
around the CCJ.6 This article relies upon forty-one interviews conducted with 
major stakeholders in the CCJ system, including judges, lawyers, civil servants, 
private business, and civil society groups. 
This interview-based approach combines with the authority theory 
developed by Alter, Helfer, and Madsen.7 The authors focus mainly on three 
 
 5.  Interview n. 9 (Oct. 23, 2013). See also POLLARD, supra note 1, at 91–93 (detailing the 
importance of a stable political climate within CARICOM to foreign investors). Citations to an 
interview list the interviewee’s number and the date on which the interview was conducted. 
 6.  For details on this approach, see generally Mikael Rask Madsen, Reflexivity and the 
Construction of the International Object: The Case of Human Rights, 5 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL 
SOCIOLOGY 259 (2011); Yves Dezalay & Mikael R. Madsen, The Force of Law and Lawyers: Pierre 
Bourdieu and the Reflexive Sociology of Law, 8 ANN. REV. OF L. AND SOC. SCI. 433 (2012). 
 7.  This article relies on the definitions of authority laid out in the introduction to this symposium. 
See Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes the Authority of 
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different types of authority in fact that an international court (IC) might have: 
narrow, intermediate, and broad authority. In all three cases, the theory 
assesses authority based on whether the relevant constituencies regard IC 
decisions as binding and providing impetus for making consequential changes in 
behavior. In this theoretical model, an IC has narrow authority when the 
immediate parties of specific disputes recognize the IC’s decisions as binding 
and take consequential steps toward compliance. An IC has intermediate 
authority when an extended group of practitioners and multiple litigants 
acknowledge the binding nature of an IC’s rulings and act in accordance in 
words or deed. Finally, an IC has broad authority when a larger legal field—
comprising, for example, academics, civil society, government officials, and 
politicians—considers the rulings of an IC as binding sources of law and actively 
engages in the formation of legal norms’ content, based on a priori acceptance 
of the existence of the IC in question. As this article shows, this theory works 
well for explaining the authority of the CCJ, which empirically has evolved from 
narrow authority to intermediate authority. The authority of the Court is 
currently marked both by growing popular support in some member states and 
by increasing reluctance in other member states, particularly with regard to the 
Court’s recent free-movement rulings. 
The article proceeds in the following way. Part II analyzes the protracted 
genesis of the CCJ with particular focus on the trajectories of the Court’s two 
main regional contexts—the Caribbean Community and the post-colonial 
context of Transnational English law and the Privy Council. Part III first 
discusses the CCJ’s initial establishment and its rather narrow authority during 
the Court’s first years of operation. Then, part III turns to address the recent 
developments in the Court’s case law, which indicate an expansion of authority. 
Among other things, in this last part we focus on a fundamental-rights 
jurisprudence that has spurred a new popular interest in the Court. 
II 
THE PROTRACTED GENESIS OF A CARIBBEAN COMMON COURT 
Although the CCJ has only been in operation since 2005, the process toward 
establishing the Court dates back more than a century. In fact, the conception 
of “Caribbean integration through law” goes back even further. The Caribbean 
was first assembled as a regional legal entity under British rule and later 
regionalized under the auspices of CARIFTA and CARICOM.8 Although there 
appears at first glance a historical continuity between the British colonial rule 
and the launch of regional integration under these regional organizations, the 
duality of the CCJ’s jurisdiction firmly underlines that the Court is by no means 
a transition from one dimension of integration to the other. On the contrary, 
the two dimensions of integration coexist to this day as common law and 
 
International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 9–12. 
 8.  See generally ANTHONY PAYNE, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF CARICOM (2008) (recounting 
transition from British rule to CARIFTA to CARICOM).  
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Community law, respectively.9 This implies that the integration processes prior 
to the establishment of the CCJ are not simply historical preliminaries to its 
establishment, but also key contexts for explaining its relative authority today. 
These historical precursors to the CCJ are discussed below. 
A. The English Passage: Law as Imported Knowledge 
Although many European powers have attempted to control the Caribbean, 
the British rule of the West Indies is undoubtedly the most significant 
contextual factor influencing the CCJ.10 Generally, British rule implied a degree 
of legalism that differed from the previous Spanish conquest. If, as argued by 
Naipaul, Spanish rule was marked by the pragmatic notion of se obedece, per no 
se cumple (of obeying the law but not following it),11 the British Empire 
introduced a real recourse to English law and to the relatively advanced legal 
technology of London. This possible recourse and remedy became an integral 
legal and political factor in the fabric of West Indian society and undoubtedly 
an important part of its post-colonial heritage. The first proposals for a 
Caribbean common court were precisely a reaction to the British legal 
domination. For example, in 1901 a well-known Jamaican newspaper argued 
that law should be “repatriated” to the Caribbean by a Caribbean Court 
replacing the JCPC.12 
At the Montego Bay Conference in 1947, the British took up the idea of a 
regional Caribbean court of last resort as part of a project for creating a West 
Indian federation. Motivating this suggestion was the British desire to limit the 
costs of maintaining its empire. It was a full decade later, however, in 1958, that 
the project bore fruit with the establishment of the West Indies Federation, 
which included a Federal Supreme Court. The Federation was operational for 
only four years, collapsing with the independence of Jamaica and Trinidad & 
Tobago in 1962 and of many more Caribbean states shortly thereafter.13 
Although political nationalism thereby trumped regional integration in the legal 
arena,14 most states nevertheless opted for maintaining appeals to the Privy 
Council and for membership of the Commonwealth as part of their new 
 
 9.  Legally, they coexist under the organizations of the CARICOM and the Commonwealth of 
Nations.  
 10.  Martinique and Guadeloupe remain outside the CCJ’s jurisdiction because they are French 
overseas territories. Among French-speaking Caribbean states, only Haiti is a plausible new party to 
the CCJ, at least with respect to its original jurisdiction, given that it is a member state of CARICOM. 
Among the former Dutch colonies, Suriname is a CARICOM member state, and it ratified the 
Agreement of the CCJ in 2001.  
 11.  VIDIADHAR SURAJPRASAD NAIPAUL, THE LOSS OF ELDORADO: A COLONIAL HISTORY 15 
(2001). 
 12.  POLLARD, supra note 1, at xi. 
 13. See generally JOHN MORDECAI, THE WEST INDIES: THE FEDERAL NEGOTIATIONS (1968) 
(describing the history of the West Indies Federation).  
 14.  See generally Charles H. Archibald, The Failure of the West Indies Federation, 18 THE WORLD 
TODAY  233 (1962).   
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constitutional arrangements.15 With the exception of Guyana, which became a 
republic and severed ties with the Privy Council in 1970 (yet remained in the 
Commonwealth), and Grenada, which suspended the appeals to London during 
the Grenadian revolution between 1979 and 1991, the rest of the Caribbean 
states kept this transnational legal framework.16 It was only in 2005, when the 
CCJ first began hearing cases, that Barbados and Guyana opted for having the 
CCJ as their last court of appeal.17 Belize followed suit in 2010 and Dominica in 
2015.18 The other CARICOM countries retain appeals to the JCPC in London 
to this day. 
This construction of a legal system of independent states with appeals to a 
primarily English court has had significant impact on the legal profession, the 
law of the Caribbean, and, ultimately, on the CCJ. For example, the training of 
lawyers has long been an English cultural transplant, but now it is increasingly 
performed by local agents trained in the former colonial metropolis. The 
investment in English law by local elites both before and after independence 
created an incentive to promote English law as a way of sustaining their own 
interests. Interviews with the generation of lawyers trained from the 1950s to 
the 1970s generally confirm this image of a set of practitioners who learned 
about the Caribbean as a collective entity in two different, yet ultimately 
connected, ways. In Oxbridge, in Caribbean debating societies such as the West 
Indian Society of Oxford, many law students encountered for the very first time 
the idea of the Caribbean as a united entity.19 In addition to imagining the 
region from the more aloof distance of Oxbridge, many of these young lawyers 
subsequently came to practice as what some interviewees called “banana boat 
lawyers”20—a label indicating that trained lawyers were scarce and the larger 
metropolitan areas of the Caribbean often supplied legal expertise to many of 
the other island states. The term derives more precisely from the function of the 
banana boats, which provided the means of transportation for these lawyers—at 
least until the creation of Caribbean commercial airlines facilitated modern-day 
air traffic. 
To this generation and social grouping of lawyers, the Caribbean emerged 
culturally and legally out of these different but related legal practices, both in 
England and throughout the Caribbean basin. Although the lawyers in question 
 
      15.     ROSE-MARIE B. ANTOINE, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 307 
(2008). 
      16.     Id. 
 17.  Armand de Mestral, The Constitutional Functions of the Caribbean Court of Justice, 1 MCGILL 
J. DISP. RESOL. 43, 65 (2015). 
 18.  Several Eastern Caribbean countries manifested the intention of ratifying the appellate 
jurisdiction of the CCJ at the fifty-fourth meeting of the OECS in 2012. In 2014, Dominica became the 
first Eastern Caribbean State to leave the JCPC, at which point it submitted to the appellate 
jurisdiction of the CCJ. Caribbean Court of Justice, The CCJ Welcomes Dominica to its Appellate 
Jurisdiction, Media Release No. 6:2015 (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/MEDIA-RELEASE-06-2015.pdf.  
 19.  Interviews n. 9 (Oct. 23, 2013); n. 18 (Oct. 25, 2013); n. 23 (Oct. 30, 2013).  
 20.  Interviews n. 3 (Oct. 21, 2013); n. 1 (Oct. 21, 2013); n. 9 (Oct. 23, 2013); n. 10 (Oct. 23, 2013). 
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generally present themselves as Caribbean, they have in most cases not only 
maintained very close links to the United Kingdom, but also a candid 
skepticism toward local legal knowledge. These lawyers are best described as 
“transnational legal elites”21 whose practices are based on a superior knowledge 
of English law, close contacts to London chambers, and an ability to solve local 
problems with transnational solutions. In fact, the connection to the United 
Kingdom has been used both legally, by bringing cases to the JCPC through 
their knowledge of English law, and politically, by bringing in senior English 
barristers (known as Queen’s Counsel) to solve local political problems and 
generally questioning the quality and germaneness of local resources. This 
connection to the United Kingdom has produced a unique transnational 
platform for practicing law (and also often politics), which conspicuously plays 
on post-colonial anxieties with respect to the allegedly superior solutions 
offered in the former imperial metropolis. Importantly, this dominant group of 
lawyers long viewed the idea of a regional appellate court with suspicion. It 
potentially contested their privileges and power by challenging the hegemony of 
common law made in England yet practiced by this local transnational legal–
political elite.22 
It took a major event to transform these perceptions—namely, the JCPC 
overstepping what the transatlantic (and also the more nationalistic) elites were 
willing to accept from the former colonial power’s legal system. The issue at 
stake was the death penalty—a widespread punishment during the colonial era 
preserved by many Caribbean states, but no longer in sync with the standards of 
contemporary Europe. The key ruling was Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney 
General of Jamaica,23 which resulted in a “near de facto abolition of the death 
penalty” in the Commonwealth Caribbean.24 Drawing largely on European 
human rights precedents, the JCPC concluded that a delay of more than five 
years in carrying out a death sentence was an “inhuman and degrading 
punishment”25 contrary to the Jamaican Constitution. The Privy Council applied 
the same approach to death penalty appeals from Trinidad & Tobago and 
Barbados. This approach placed the established political and legal elites in the 
three largest Commonwealth Caribbean states in open conflict with the JCPC, 
which they accused of legislating on behalf of the region. 
 
 21.  See Niilo Kauppi & Mikael Rask Madsen, Transnational Power Elites: The New Professionals 
of Governance, Law and Security, in TRANSNATIONAL POWER ELITES: THE NEW PROFESSIONALS OF 
GOVERNANCE, LAW AND SECURITY 1, 3–8 (Niilo Kauppi & Mikael R. Madsen eds., 2013) (defining 
“transnational legal elites”). 
 22.  According to one interviewee, several law firms in Trinidad specialize in cases before the Privy 
Council. They have generally been opposed to the CCJ for fear of losing clients. Interview n. 28 (Nov. 
6, 2013). 
 23.  Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney General of Jamaica [1993] 2 AC 1 (PC) (appeal taken from the 
Court of Appeal of Jamaica). 
 24.  Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1879 
(2002). 
 25.  Pratt and Morgan [1994] 2 AC ¶ 64. 
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This situation created a unique window for the CCJ’s establishment as an 
indigenous court of appeal. Yet ten years later, when the CCJ eventually began 
to hear cases, only Barbados chose to leave the Privy Council behind. In 
contrast, Trinidad & Tobago exercised its wrath on the Inter-American human 
rights tribunals (which issued rulings also disfavoring the death penalty) by 
withdrawing from the American Convention on Human Rights in 1998, but it 
remained under the JCPC’s jurisdiction.26 Further demonstrating the Court’s 
growing importance, Jamaica actually passed three bills in 2004 that made the 
CCJ its highest court.27 Although the JCPC subsequently struck down these bills 
as they implied a significant alteration in the state’s hierarchical court structure 
that required a constitutional amendment, a majority in Jamaica’s parliament 
clearly supported the CCJ over the JCPC.28 
There was however also a visible reverse effect of linking the establishment 
of the CCJ to death row. Even before the CCJ formally opened, a new set of 
critics tarred the tribunal as a “hanging court” specifically formed to ensure the 
continuous use of capital punishment in the Caribbean.29 This put the nascent 
Court in the difficult situation of not only having to establish its authority on 
CARICOM law, but also finding a solution to the question of capital 
punishment that both appeased its advocates and met international human 
rights standards. 
B. The Caribbean Passage: “Caribbean Integration through Law” 
The Caribbean’s integration through law provides another regional context 
relevant to the eventual development of the CCJ’s jurisprudence. During 
British rule, both locals and the empire supported attempts to establish local 
higher education—in part to limit the costs of studies abroad for students.30 The 
opening of the University College of the West Indies in 1948, now the 
University of the West Indies (UWI), eventually produced an alternative path 
to that of the Oxbridge-educated elite: a Caribbean higher education. The UWI 
Law Faculty was created in 1970 and was followed by the establishment of a 
number of local law schools certified to issue legal diplomas in Jamaica (1973), 
Trinidad & Tobago (1973), and The Bahamas (1998).31 A different social 
 
 26.  A limited attempt was made by Trinidad & Tobago to accept the CCJ’s jurisdiction only for 
matters of criminal law; other cases would go to the JCPC. The plan, however, has not been 
implemented. See generally POLLARD, supra note 1 (describing the formation and development of the 
CCJ). 
 27.  The Caribbean Court of Justice Act 2004: Act 20 and 21 of 2004 and the Judicature Act, Act 
19 of 2004.   
 28.  Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (1998) Ltd. & Ors v. Marshall-Burnett and 
Anor [2005] 2 A.C. 356 (PC) 372 (appeal taken from the Court of Appeals of Jamaica).  
 29.   HUGH RAWLINS, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF 
THE DEBATE 28 (2000); David Simmons, The Caribbean Court of Justice: A Unique Institution of 
Caribbean Creativity, 29 NOVA L. REV. 171, 186 (2005). 
 30.  ANNE SPRY RUSH, BONDS OF EMPIRE: WEST INDIANS AND BRITISHNESS FROM VICTORIA 
TO DECOLONIZATION 21–46 (2011). 
 31.  Legal studies were also offered at the University of Guyana.  
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grouping of lawyers emerged from the UWI law campuses, one more radically 
attuned to the Caribbean, a fact in part attributable to the political and 
historical conjunctures of the 1970s. Importantly, however, the locally trained 
lawyers were not (and are not) turned against English law. The common law 
was not only part of their curriculum but also part of the law of the Caribbean. 
Although many among this new group of lawyers pursued LL.M.s in the 
United Kingdom, they shared neither the transnational legal elite’s vested 
interests in English law nor their relative reluctance toward genuine Caribbean 
law.32 In important ways, the UWI became the laboratory for a different kind of 
Caribbean integration. More similar to the practices of the “banana boat 
lawyers,” who practiced law by traveling between surrounding islands, than to 
the Oxbridge campus, these students were obliged to move around the 
Caribbean to get their diplomas, which in itself contributed to the creation of a 
collective identity.33 Moreover, the students were introduced to elements of 
Caribbean law from the different regional states, effectively training them to 
become a new generation of “banana boat lawyers.” Adding classes on 
Caribbean history and culture, the result was unmistakably Caribbean.34 Despite 
this movement toward Caribbean law and away from English law, the 
institutional recognition of the significance of this movement did not occur until 
years later. For example, the UWI only first offered a class on the particular 
topic of Caribbean law and integration in the early 2000s, which coincided with 
the opening of the CCJ. Similarly, the first systematic textbook on the subject 
did not appear until 2014.35 
This very gradual emergence of Community law did not result from a lack of 
interest among these locally trained lawyers. Rather, it was largely an effect of 
CARICOM’s slow development,36 particularly with respect to its law. 
Generally, the development of the Caribbean community has largely unfolded 
in reaction to major external changes often involving the United Kingdom. For 
example, when the United Kingdom initiated the process of becoming a 
member of the European Community in the early 1960s, it was clear to many 
Caribbean leaders that late-colonial special treatment would soon be a thing of 
the past.37 These leaders proved prophetic; the Caribbean Free Trade 
Association (CARIFTA) was created in the mid-1960s. Less than a decade 
later, in 1973—when the United Kingdom formally joined the European 
Community—it was transformed into the more politically ambitious Caribbean 
 
 32.  Interview n. 43 (Dec. 4, 2014). 
 33.  Indeed, this had a somewhat similar effect to the EU Erasmus programs in Europe. See, e.g., 
Bruno De Witte, European Union Law: A Unified Academic Discipline?, in LAWYERING EUROPE: 
EUROPEAN LAW AS A TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD 101, 109 (Antoine Vauchez & Bruno de Witte 
eds., 2013). 
 34.  Interview n. 24 (Oct. 31, 2013). 
 35. The textbook is DAVID BERRY, CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION LAW (2014). 
 36.  See generally CHRISTOPH MÜLLERLEILE, CARICOM INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND 
HURDLES: A EUROPEAN VIEW (1996) (detailing the slow development of CARICOM). 
 37.  Payne,  supra note 8, at 14. 
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Community and Common Market. A third major transformation occurred at 
the end of the Cold War, when the region was once again forced to further 
reorganize and strengthen integration.38 The Single European Market 
jeopardized what was left of preferential economic treatment of Caribbean 
states by the United Kingdom. The favorable trade conditions granted under 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative39 were equally threatened by the NAFTA 
agreement between Canada, the United States, and most importantly, Mexico. 
Inspired by these changes in the world economy, a commission chaired by 
the former Commonwealth Secretary-General “Sonny” Ramphal was 
established.40 The Commission produced a report that prioritized the 
legalization of the CARICOM.41 The Commission presented a number of 
proposals, including: the creation of an EU-inspired commission vested with 
executive and administrative powers, the introduction of a regional legislative 
system, the effective realization of the Common Market and Single Economy, 
and importantly, the creation of the CCJ. About the latter, the Ramphal 
Commission noted: “[T]he case for the CARICOM Supreme Court, with both a 
general appellate jurisdiction and an original regional one, is now 
overwhelming—indeed it is fundamental to the process of integration itself.”42 
This plan unsurprisingly found support on the UWI campuses and among its 
alumni.43 Other legal and political elites, however, many of whom had made the 
passage through England, were less enthusiastic. The idea of an executive 
commission was flat-out rejected. Only the proposals for setting up a regional 
court and for creating the Common Market and Single Economy survived. The 
eventual establishment of the Court was effectively enabled by a combination 
of those arguing for the urgency of reforming the CARICOM in light of global 
economic changes and the more nationalistic and sovereignty-craving groups 
that had opposed a supranational executive. As analyzed above, however, the 
Privy Council also helped pave the road for the CCJ’s palatability to both the 
nationalistic and transatlantic elites. The result was the current CCJ with double 
jurisdiction: as highest court over the interpretation of the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas and as final court of appeal for civil and criminal cases. 
 
 38.  Caribbean Community Secretariat, Grande Anse Declaration and Work Programme for the 
Advancement of the Integration Movement, at 1 (July 1989). 
 39.  The Caribbean Basin Initiative was a unilateral program of the United States initiated by the 
Reagan Administration regarding Caribbean and Central American countries. It was established in 
1984, and its main goal was to provide several tariff and trade benefits to the Caribbean and Central 
American countries in the commerce with the United States in order to fight the spread of socialism 
and communism within the region. W. H. Griffith, CARICOM Countries and the Caribbean Basin 
Initative, 17 LATIN AM. PERSP, 33, 33 (1990).  
 40.  Anthony Payne, Statesman of the West Indies, in SHRIDATH RAMPHAL: THE 
COMMONWEALTH AND THE WORLD 95–112 (2008). 
 41.  WEST INDIAN COMMISSION, TIME FOR ACTION: REPORT OF THE WEST INDIAN COMMISSION 
498 (2d ed. 1992).  
 42.  Id. 
 43.  In fact, this legal model was already identified in 1972 in a report by the Organization of 
Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Association, which argued that the solution was to create a court with a 
double competence. POLLARD, supra note 1, at 2. 
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III 
IN SEARCH OF AUTHORITY: THE CCJ FROM NARROW TO BROAD AUTHORITY 
The above analysis has considered the different and opposing forces at play 
regarding the creation of the CCJ—the post-colonial transformation, the 
dominant transatlantic production of law, and the evolving Caribbean legal 
milieus at the UWI. These different forces produced a relative schism between 
common law and Community law, one that eventually translated into the 
creation of the CCJ with a dual jurisdiction. The Court coming into operation 
therefore inevitably involved two different operational contexts that have 
considerably different trajectories and agency. The following discussion 
analyzes the gradual expansion of the CCJ’s authority, from its initial rulings on 
free market law and capital punishment, to its most recent case law, which has 
extended the CCJ’s authority by means of a new fundamental-rights 
jurisprudence with constitutional implications. The emphasis is, however, on the 
original jurisdiction of the Court. 
A. Overcoming Socio-Political Constraints through Judicial Independence 
The initial challenges faced by the CCJ reflected the limited legalization of 
Caribbean integration and the still-ambiguous relation to London 
notwithstanding the death row issue. Thus, the nascent Court had to both affirm 
itself within the area of CARICOM law and develop a solution for the 
outstanding issue of capital punishment that simultaneously satisfied its 
advocates and international human rights standards—all while avoiding the 
reputation of a “hanging court.”44 This challenge reflected itself practically in all 
preliminary actions of the emerging Court, which sought to secure its 
independence legally, politically, and financially. The CCJ’s pursuit of 
independence had significant structural results, namely: the appointment of the 
first President of the Court, the appointment of the other judges, and the 
creation of a trust fund for administering the financial resources of the Court. 
Whereas IC presidents are mostly elected by the collegium of judges, in the 
case of the CCJ, the President was appointed before the other judges by the 
Heads of States following recommendations of an expert commission.45 Insiders 
were well aware of the political and symbolic implications of this unique 
appointment procedure. Moreover, the selection also had real consequences, as 
the President’s appointment resulted in automatic designation as the Chairman 
of the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission, the organ vested with 
the power to appoint the other judges.46 Given the influence of this position and 
the generally suspicious attitude of Caribbean legal professionals toward the 
 
 44.  Simmons, supra note 29, at 186–88. 
 45.  Article VI (6) of the Agreement establishes that the President is appointed by a qualified 
majority vote of three quarters of the contracting parties after the recommendation of the Regional 
Judicial and Legal Services Commission. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice art. 
VI (Feb. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Agreement]. 
 46.  Id. art. VII. 
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local judiciary, the appointment of the first President constituted a first crucial 
step for the establishment of the CCJ and its authority. 
In 2004, the Conference unanimously nominated Michael de la Bastide,47 a 
well-known Pan-Caribbean lawyer, former President of the Law Association of 
Trinidad and Tobago and former Chief Justice of Trinidad & Tobago.48 De la 
Bastide embodied many of the virtues of the old legal elite, but he was also a 
modern judge. His connections to the United Kingdom were immaculate: he 
graduated top of his class at Oxford in 1959–60, he became a member of Gray’s 
Inn in London in 1956, and he eventually became a member of the Privy 
Council in 2004—less than three weeks before taking office as the President of 
the CCJ. In Trinidad, de la Bastide’s career was equally impressive and 
involved all the key venues of the legal (and political) elite: he had been in 
private practice as a Queen’s Counsel, served in public office as an independent 
Senator, been a representative on several important government commissions, 
served as the Crown Counsel in the office of the Attorney-General, and served 
as the Chief Justice of Trinidad & Tobago (1995–2002).49 
Publicly outspoken, de la Bastide had also made a name for himself as an 
ardent defender of judicial independence. In fact, before being appointed to the 
CCJ, de la Bastide had already fought for the independence of the judiciary in 
Trinidad & Tobago for decades. Particularly, his public clashes over the issue 
with the then Attorney-General Ramesh Maharaj were known throughout the 
region (and were only settled when Lord MacKay was brought in from 
London).50 The appointment of de la Bastide thus signaled the impartiality and 
independence of the CCJ. As President of the CCJ, he chaired the Regional 
Judicial and Legal Services Commission, which was created to insulate judicial 
appointments from political pressure.51 The independence of the CCJ was 
further enhanced by the fact that the Court’s finances were placed in an 
independent fund of some 100 million U.S. dollars,52 and managed by an 
independent board of trustees.53 Operating from the vantage point as both 
President of the nascent CCJ and Chairman of the appointment committee, de 
la Bastide argued that the Caribbean should aspire to have “a world class 
court.”54 There were plenty of applicants for seats on the bench and twelve were 
eventually interviewed. The collegium of judges selected struck a fine balance 
 
 47.  Simmons, supra note 29, at 193. 
 48.  Interview n. 3 (Oct. 21, 2013). 
49.  Judges of the CCJ: Past President—The Right Honourable Mr. Justice Michael de la Bastide, 
THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/judges/ 
past-president-%E2%80%93-the-rt-hon-mr-justice-michael-de-la-bastide (last visited Dec. 29, 2015). 
 50.  Interviews n. 9 (Oct. 23, 2013); n. 20 (Oct. 28, 2013). 
 51.  Agreement, supra note 45, art. 6. 
 52.  Birdsong, supra note 2, at 211. 
 53.  This had been decided in 2002 at the Twenty-third Meeting of the Conference precisely with 
the goal of enhancing its impartiality and independence as a response to critics of the local judiciary. 
Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice Trust Fund (Jan. 12, 2004) [hereinafter The 
Trust Fund Agreement]. 
 54.  Interview n. 3 (Oct. 12, 2013).  
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between judicial and academic experience, national and international 
experience, and geographic distribution. More precisely, the bench represented 
a microcosm of the complexities faced by the Court, including the difference 
between transatlantic and Caribbean constructions of the region, common law 
and Community law, and the old and the new elites of Caribbean law.55 
B. Limits by Institutional Design 
The careful selection of the CCJ bench, and the underlying strategy for 
maximizing both independence and legitimacy, did not change the fact that the 
Court faced a number of challenges emanating from its design. Most of these 
were linked to the overall reluctance of Caribbean States to relinquish 
sovereignty.56 Although the RTC introduced some changes to the region’s 
integration system,57 CARICOM remained mostly a system controlled by 
member states and not a supranational organization. Concretely, the 
Community did not have legislative powers. Consequently, there was no 
immediate secondary legislation applicable within the member states.58 The 
legal mandate of the CCJ was thus limited to interpreting and applying the RTC 
itself.59 CARICOM’s interstate emphasis translated into restrictions on access to 
the Court. Whereas the Ramphal Commission had proposed the establishment 
of an Executive Secretariat modeled on the European Commission to overcome 
 
 55.  In addition to President de la Bastide, the first bench included judges with significant 
experience in Caribbean Community law such as Duke Pollard of Guyana, who had studied at the 
University of London and, among other things, had been the Legal Advisor of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat as well as the CARICOM Secretariat. He also played a key role in the negotiations and 
drafting surrounding the treaties for issues related to the CCJ. Other judges were leading experts of 
Caribbean common law and national laws: Rolston Nelson of Trinidad & Tobago, who, after studying 
at the University of Oxford and University of London, practiced and taught in Jamaica and Trinidad & 
Tobago; Adrian Saunders of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, who studied at UWI and at the Hugh 
Wooding Law School of Trinidad & Tobago before being appointed Chief Justice of the Eastern 
Caribbean Supreme Court; and Desiree Bernard of Guyana, who studied law at the University of 
London before being appointed as Chief Justice and Chancellor of the Judiciary of Guyana. In addition 
to judges knowledgeable of Community law and national Caribbean law, two more judges, experienced 
with civil and European law and business law, including trust law, completed the bench: Jacob Wit of 
the Netherlands had a law degree from the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam and had been a judge at 
the Joint Court of Justice of the Netherlands, Antilles, and Aruba and was clearly intended to be the 
civil-law and EU law judge on the court; and David Hayton of England, who received his law degree 
from the Newcastle University before serving as law professor and Dean of the Law Faculty at King’s 
College, London and  combined academia and practice as a leading authority on the law of trusts. 
Judges of the Caribbean Court of Justice, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.caribbean 
courtofjustice.org/about-the-ccj/judges.  
 56.  See generally BERRY, supra note 35; O'Brien & Foadi, supra note 4, at 346. 
 57.  The creation of the CCJ, the Common Market, and the Single Economy introduces elements 
not in full control of the states. The RTC also softened the requirement of unanimity for the 
substantive decisions of the Conference of the Heads of Government. O’Brien & Foadi, supra note 4, 
at 337–39. 
 58.   O'Brien & Foadi, supra note 4, at. 342–43. 
 59.  Derek O'Brien & Sonia Morano-Foadi, The Caribbean Court of Justice and Legal Integration 
within CARICOM: Some Lessons from the European Community, 8 L. & PRAC. OF INT’L CTS. & 
TRIBUNALS 399, 404 (2009). 
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the serious implementation problems faced by the CARICOM,60 the RTC 
included only a modest expansion of the Secretariat’s powers, such as the right 
of the Secretary-General to submit proposals to the organs of the Community 
and to legally represent it,61 including before the CCJ. However, his power 
remained constrained. For example, the Secretariat did not have the right to 
initiate legal proceedings before the CCJ on behalf of private parties but 
instead only had the right to serve as a representative for the Community.62 
Other institutional features of the CARICOM also limited the operational 
space of the CCJ. Notably, the wording of the Article 222 RTC,63 which 
regulates the conditions that individuals need to meet for accessing the Court, 
was drafted in way that appeared to limit private access and to establish the 
CCJ as mainly an interstate court to satisfy the involved governments’ craving 
for sovereignty.64 Two interviewees, both close to the drafting process, 
confirmed that Article 222 was strategically drafted as an open-ended article, 
with either the hope—according to one interviewee—or with the 
convincement—according to the other—that the future judges of the CCJ 
would interpret the Article in an extensive way.65 As discussed below, Article 
222(c) in particular created several problems in the first cases reaching the 
Court and probably constrained the flow of subsequent cases as well. 
There are other relevant access provisions, notably Article 211 RTC. 
 
 60.  West Indian Commission, supra note 41, at 501–02. 
 61.  Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community arts. 24(a), (g), July 4, 1973, http://www.cari 
com.org/jsp/community/original_treaty-text.pdf [hereinafter Treaty]. 
 62.  Regarding the difficulties of the CCJ caused by the absence of a European Commission-like 
commission, see O’Brien & Morano-Foadi, supra note 4, at 340.  
 63.  Article 222 RTC regulates the Locus Standi of private entities before the Court. The text of 
the Article proceeds as follows:  
Persons, natural or juridical, of a Contracting Party may, with the special leave of the Court, 
be allowed to appear as parties in proceedings before the Court where:  
(a) the Court has determined in any particular case that this Treaty intended that a right or 
benefit conferred by or under this Treaty on a Contracting Party shall ensure to the benefit of 
such persons directly; and 
(b) the persons concerned have established that such persons have been prejudiced in respect 
of the enjoyment of the right or benefit mentioned in paragraph (a) of this Article; and 
(c) the Contracting Party entitled to espouse the claim in proceedings before 
the Court has: 
(i) omitted or declined to espouse the claim, or 
(ii) expressly agreed that the persons concerned may espouse the claim instead of the 
Contracting Party so entitled; and 
(d) the Court has found that the interest of justice requires that the persons be allowed to 
espouse the claim. 
Treaty, supra note 61, art. 222.  
 64.  See interview n. 15 (Oct. 24, 2013); see also Desiree P. Bernard, Olive Trotmans Memorial 
Lecture Series: The Caribbean Court of Justice and Its Relationship with the Caribbean Single Market 
Economy (2006);  Duke E. Pollard, The Caribbean Court of Justice: Who Stands to Gain?, in 
FIFTEENTH PUBLIC LECTURE OF THE MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
(MIND) (2008). 
 65.  Interviews n. 35 & 36 (Dec. 5, 2014).  
CASERTA AND MADSEN_1-8 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2016 11:08 AM 
102 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:89 
Although it formally grants broad access to the CCJ,66 it is more limited in 
practice. In fact, although the main access points to the Court are via 
applications by member states and by the Community against member states, 
these avenues are rarely used for sociopolitical reasons. Caribbean governments 
have a tacit understanding not to sue each other before the CCJ and to instead 
resort to “informal” ways of solving conflicts.67 Likewise, an application by the 
Community against member states is highly unlikely. As noted by lawyers close 
to the Secretariat, the Secretary-General is highly constrained in the exercise of 
this function as guardian of the community because the position is perceived as 
representing the member states, not as opposing them.68 A third access point to 
the CCJ, in addition to applications by member states and by the Community 
against member states, is comprised of references from national judges. But this 
access point has yet to produce its first case.69 The specialized literature on the 
CCJ and the authors’ interviews generally suggest that the absence of 
references by national judges is due to both general lack of knowledge about 
the Court and the uncertainties of the role that CARICOM Community law 
plays in national legal systems.70 
The practical result of these institutional design features was that the initial 
development of Community law litigation came to depend on direct 
applications from private litigants.71 The interest of private actors in using the 
CCJ was however somewhat constrained by the limited knowledge of the 
Court’s original jurisdiction.72 In addition, many private companies feared they 
would face retaliation if they sued the states in which they wanted to do 
business.73 Some of the same issues impacted the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction. 
Above all, the lingering reluctant attitude toward the CCJ by the transatlantic 
 
 66.  Article 211 RTC regulates the access to the Court and proceeds as follows: 
Subject to this Treaty, the Court shall have compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and 
determine disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty, including: 
(a) disputes between the Member States parties to the Agreement; 
(b) disputes between the Member States parties to the Agreement and the Community; 
(c) referrals from national courts of the Member States parties to the Agreement; 
(d) applications by persons in accordance with Article 222. 
Treaty, supra note 61, art. 211.  
 67.  O’Brien & Morano-Foadi, supra note 4, at 347.  
 68.  BERRY, supra note 35, at 404.  
 69.  From our interviews, it appears however that attempts have been made at least on two 
occasions. 
 70.  O’Brien & Morano-Foadi, supra note 59, at 425. Interviews n. 9 (Oct. 23, 2013); n. 28 (Nov. 6, 
2013).  
 71.  The Court itself recognized the central role of private parties when it acknowledged that “[t]he 
[Common Market and Single Economy] is intended to be private sector driven.” TCL v. Guyana, App. 
No. AR 1 of 2008 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice [CCJ], ¶ 13 (Jan. 15, 2009). 
 72.  Interview n. 9 (Oct. 23, 2013).  
 73.  Interview n. 19 (Oct. 26, 2013); see generally James Thuo Gathii, Variation in the Use of 
Subregional Integration Courts between Business and Human Right Actors: The Case of the East African 
Court of Justice, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 47–48 (describing a comparable situation 
in East Africa). 
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legal elites, in combination with the foot-dragging approach of the member 
states with regard to severing ties with the Privy Council, limited the 
operational space of the CCJ. 
C. “We Were Waiting, We Were Hoping”: The Caribbean Court (Finally) in 
Action 
The CCJ’s initial challenges in developing its authority were two-fold. On 
the one hand, the judges needed to overcome the Byzantine wording of Article 
222 to give private litigants access under the Court’s original jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, as to the appellate jurisdiction, the judges had to strike a very 
fine balance on capital punishment to ensure that the Court was neither 
perceived as a “hanging court” nor as a local epigone of the Privy Council. Yet 
to take any action, the CCJ depended on cases arriving. It was a waiting game. 
In the words of one judge at the time, “We were waiting, we were hoping [that 
someone would file an application].”74 The first appeals to arrive were from 
Barbados in 2005.75 Original jurisdiction suits were not filed until 2008.76 
The first case of importance to the establishment of the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction authority was Attorney General v. Joseph and Boyce.77 In this 
judgment, the CCJ established two key principles. First, the Court stated that its 
role was neither to ignore nor to be bound by the jurisprudence of the JCPC. 
Instead, its task was to reexamine the precedents of the JCPC and to outline the 
basic features of the approach that the CCJ would take in addressing similar 
issues.78 Second, the Court explained that the jurisprudence of the JCPC on 
death penalty was only partly correct and added its own view on the issue.79 
Thus the Court demonstrated its capability to impose itself as the main 
interpreter and creator of a genuinely Caribbean jurisprudence. With this line 
of argument, the Court managed to reject charges that the CCJ would either be 
a “hanging court” or that it would uncritically follow the JCPC. In the period 
between 2005 and 2015, 143 cases were filed under the appellate jurisdiction.80 
This relatively high number of cases suggests that the Court was almost 
 
 74.  Interview n. 3 (Oct. 21, 2013). 
 75.  Barbados Rediffusion Serv. Ltd. v. ASHS Mirchandani Ram Mirchandani McDonald Farms 
Ltd., App. No. AL 0001 of 2005 (Appellate Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice [CCJ] (Oct. 26, 
2005).  
 76.  Trinidad Cement Ltd. TCL Guyana, Inc. v. The Co-operative Republic of Guyana, App. No. 
AR 1 of 2008 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice [CCJ] (July 22, 2008). 
 77.  Attorney General v. Joseph and Boyce, Appeal No. CV 2 of 2005 (Appellate Jurisdiction), 
Caribbean Court of Justice [CCJ] (Nov. 8, 2006).  
 78.  Id. ¶ 17. 
 79.  Id. ¶ 126. 
 80.  The cases deriving from Barbados are mainly appeals regarding convictions for murder and 
relative conversion of the death penalty in incarceration, defamation, transfer of land and property, 
delays in carrying out trials and judgments, as well as other procedural issues. Cases from Guyana 
concern mainly employment issues, removal of public officers, land rights, and disrespect of debentures. 
As to Belize, the cases presented have concerned corruption of public officials, constitutionality of laws, 
tax privileges, issues related to foreign arbitration, and land rights. THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2015). 
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immediately accepted as an authoritative forum. Although the cases concerning 
the appellate jurisdiction primarily derived from the three countries that had 
first ratified the Court’s appellate jurisdiction domestically, the case flow had a 
legitimizing effect even outside of these countries. 
This became evident in 2008 when the CCJ received the first case under its 
original jurisdiction. The case was emblematic of the Court’s narrow authority 
at this point regarding Community law. The applicant was a Pan-Caribbean 
company, Trinidad Cement Limited (TCL), whose CEO, Dr. Rollin Bertrand, 
had insider knowledge of the Court from his position as the Chairman of the 
CCJ’s Trust Fund to which he had been appointed in his capacity as President 
of the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce.81 This intimacy caused 
heated debates in the press when President Jagdeo of Guyana openly accused 
Bertrand of abusing of his position and called upon all CARICOM 
governments to look into the matter.82 But this strategy of delegitimization fell 
somewhat flat, as Prime Minister Golding of Jamaica two weeks later 
announced that Jamaica was satisfied with the independence of the CCJ and 
rather than question the CCJ, his country would seek to allow for the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.83 Basically, the spillover effect of the otherwise 
geographically limited appellate jurisdiction practices was that it gave authority 
to the Court in Community law matters as well. Moreover, besides venting the 
latent frustrations and different perception of regional judicial oversight and 
more generally the role of the Court, the cases filed by TCL contributed 
significantly to the launch of the CCJ’s original jurisdiction. 
Although Bertrand obviously benefitted from insider knowledge of the CCJ, 
his filing of the TCL case before the CCJ had its own legal and commercial 
rationale. In the words of a spokesperson of the applicant, the choice of venue 
was mainly the result of a “frustration deriving from CARICOM 
inefficiencies,”84 which was shared among a number of Caribbean companies. 
There was an expectation that as soon as the Court was established and set up, eight 
or nine cases would come immediately based on the frustration expressed by some 
companies. We were not unique. We just got into [it] quickly because in our view our 
interest was threatened by Guyana and by the behavior of COTED [Council for Trade 
and Economic Development]. . . . A lot of people were afraid of suing 
governments . . . . I thought: there is finally a mechanism of redress, let’s use it.
85
 
 
 81.  Interview n. 19 (Oct. 26, 2013).  
 82.  See, e.g., Regional Heads Concerned over Link between CCJ Trust Fund and TCL, STABROEK 
NEWS (Guyana) (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.stabroeknews.com/2009/archives/10/13/regional-heads-
concerned-over-link-between-ccj-trust-fund-and-tcl/. 
 83.  Moreover, the TLC CEO had been transparent about the potential conflict of interest and had 
a lawyer assess the situation before filing. TCL Disturbed by President Jagdeo’s ‘Influence’ Statement, 
STABROEK NEWS (Guyana) (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.stabroeknews.com/2009/archives/10/16/tcl-
disturbed-by-president-jagdeo%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98influence%E2%80%99-statement/. 
 84.  Interview n. 19 (Oct. 26, 2013).  
 85.  Interview n. 19 (Oct. 26, 2013). For support of the interviewee’s statement on the likelihood of 
more lawsuits at this point please see NAMILCO May Move to Caribbean Court over ‘Dumping’ of 
Trinidad Flour on Local Market, STABROEK NEWS (Guyana) (Apr. 25, 2008), 
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2008/business/04/25/namilco-may-move-to-caribbean-court-over-
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In the period from 2008 to 2012, TCL filed three cases (the first of which 
was filed together with one of the company’s Guyana branches (TGI)): one 
against the state of Guyana,86 one against the Community (CARICOM),87 and 
one against the Competition Commission of the Community.88 Collectively, 
these cases offered the Court the possibility of ruling on three highly central 
issues for the development of the jurisprudence of the Court: private access, 
state liability, and damages. 
Of these three cases, the case against Guyana is the most important because 
it directly concerned a member state’s obligation under Caribbean Community 
law. In that case, TCL and TGI claimed that Guyana had arbitrarily and 
unilaterally suspended the Common External Tariff on the imports of cement 
from outside the CARICOM, thereby violating the RTC and causing economic 
damages to the two companies.89 During the application for special leave,90 the 
judges focused on Article 222(c) RTC. The interpretive issue they faced was 
whether a private party was allowed to sue its own state. Such a right was not 
expressly recognized by the Article, which, in fact, seemed to suggest that 
private parties may only appear before the CCJ if their home country has either 
omitted or declined to present the claim itself, or where the state expressly 
agreed that the specific private person may present the claim in its place.91  
The Court’s interpretation gave particular attention to the rationale behind 
Article 222. The Court reasoned that that the RTC did not expressly indicate 
that the member states intended to prohibit private entities from bringing 
proceedings against their own state.92 The Court further stated that denying 
such a right would affect not only companies incorporated in member states 
that had violated the RTC—such as the case at bar—but it would also 
discriminate against citizens’ access to justice on the grounds of their 
nationality.93 The Court thus granted leave to TCL and TGI under Article 222.94 
 
 
 
%E2%80%98dumping%E2%80%99-of-trinidad-flour-on-local-market/. 
 86. TCL v. Guyana, supra note 71; Trinidad Cement Ltd. TCL Guyana, Inc. v. The Co-operative 
Republic of Guyana,App. No. OA 2 of 2009 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice [CCJ] 
(Feb. 27, 2009).  
 87.  TCL v. CARICOM, App. No. AR 3 of 2008 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of 
Justice [CCJ] (Feb. 5, 2009); TCL v. CARICOM, App. No. OA 1 of 2009 (Original Jurisdiction), 
Caribbean Court of Justice [CCJ] (Aug. 10, 2009).  
 88.  TCL v. The Competition Commission, App. No. OA 1 of 2012 (Original Jurisdiction), 
Caribbean Court of Justice [CCJ] (Nov. 12, 2012). 
 89.  TCL v. Guyana, App. No. AR 1 of 2008 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice 
[CCJ], ¶ 12 (Jan. 15, 2009). 
 90.  Article 222 RTC establishes that private parties need to obtain special leave from the Court 
before being admitted to present the merits of a case. Treaty, supra note 60, art. 222. 
 91. Guyana, App. No. AR 1 of 2008 (Original Jurisdiction), ¶¶ 23, 36.  
 92. Id. ¶ 40.  
 93.  Id. ¶¶ 40, 42. 
 94.  Id. ¶ 48.  
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Commenting on the case and more generally the early interpretive strategies 
of the Court, one leading judge summarized the Court’s dynamic—if not 
activist—approach, saying, 
I think there was a strong impulse toward adopting a dynamic approach. I suppose it is 
part of the human nature that having given the opportunity to make a difference, and 
to give life to this document which served a purpose that we all supported [the 
Revised Treaty], it seemed normal to not let the letters of the law frustrate you.
95
 
The CCJ was, in other words, not satisfied with simply attracting cases; it 
was also ready to give life to the idea of Community law under the RTC. The 
Court, however, was also fully aware of not overstepping its boundaries of what 
the member states would accept when it turned to the merits of the case, which 
focused on two primary issues: whether the RTC recognized the principle of 
member-state liability and whether TCL had concrete proof of its alleged loss.96 
By drawing a parallel between the interpretation that the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) had given of Article 5 of the Lisbon Treaty97 in Francovich v. 
Italy98 and the text of the Article 9 RTC,99 the CCJ recognized the existence of 
the principle of member-state liability within CARICOM law. The Court thus 
found Guyana in violation of the RTC, but it did not grant any damages 
because TCL and TGI had failed to meet their burden of proof.100 
This approach to adjudicating emerging community law resembles very 
much how both the ECtHR and the ECJ operated in their early jurisprudence 
of the 1950s and 1960s. As noted by Alter, “[T]he early jurisprudence of the 
ECJ shows clear signs of caution. Although bold in doctrinal rhetoric, the ECJ 
made sure that the political impact was minimal in terms of both financial 
consequences and political consequences.”101 Madsen has more generally 
 
 95.  Interview n. 3 (Oct. 21, 2013). 
 96.  TCL v. CARICOM, App. No. AR 3 of 2008 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of 
Justice [CCJ] (Feb. 5, 2009), ¶¶ 19, 24–31. 
 97.  Article 5 of the EEC states:  
 Member States shall take all general or particular measures which are appropriate for 
ensuring the carrying out of this Treaty or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the 
Community They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s aims.  
 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives 
of this Treaty. 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 5, Mar. 25, 1957, http://www.ab 
.gov.tr/files/ardb/evt/1_avrupa_birligi/1_3_antlasmalar/1_3_1_kurucu_antlasmalar/1957_treaty_establish
ing_eec.pdf. 
 98. Case C-6/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 ECRI-5357. 
 99.  Article 9 RTC that provides that member states shall  
take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the carrying out of 
obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from decisions taken by the Organs and 
Bodies of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the objectives of the 
Community. They shall abstain from any measures which could jeopardize the attainment of 
the objectives of this Treaty. 
Treaty, supra note 61, art. 9. 
 100.  CARICOM, App. No. AR 3 of 2008 (Original Jurisdiction), ¶¶ 32–34.  
 101.  Karen J. Alter, Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European Governments and the 
CASERTA AND MADSEN_1-8 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2016 11:08 AM 
No. 1 2016] BETWEEN COMMUNITY LAW AND COMMON LAW 107 
theorized this strategy of interpretation in terms of “legal diplomacy” and 
shown how the ECtHR in its early jurisprudence managed to balance the 
development of principles of law with sensitivity toward the member states.102 In 
interviews, CCJ judges explained that they were very conscious of not 
infuriating the member states at this early stage of institutionalization.103 The 
strategy they adopted—which consisted of establishing bold principles on topics 
such as access of private parties and member-state and Community liability, but 
without pecuniary consequences for the respondents—was effectively a form of 
“legal diplomacy.” 
Although this reflexive strategy of legal diplomacy allowed the CCJ to 
establish narrow authority as defined by Alter, Helfer, and Madsen, the 
claimants were not entirely content with the result. TCL was unsatisfied with 
the fact that it did not receive compensation, yet the company recognized that it 
had won the battle on the principle because the Court had created legal 
certainty on the procedure of suspension of the CET—a legal development of 
significant interest to the company, and other companies in the long run.104 
Throughout the case the defendant, Guyana expressed its discomfort.105 The 
Guyanese government made it known that both the lawyer on the case, Dr. 
Claude Denbow, a Guyanese citizen himself, and Dr. Bertrand, the CEO of 
TCL, were considered undesirable persons on Guyanese territory—a 
consideration that some interpreted as close-to-death threats.106 Dissatisfied, 
Guyana also initially filed for an extension of the time to comply, which the 
CCJ rejected.107 This denial of extension prompted an application by TCL for 
noncompliance, which the CCJ rejected, making it very clear that Guyana was 
in violation of the Court’s order.108 Guyana eventually complied with the 
judgment109—most likely because of pressure from other CARICOM member 
states, although this cannot be confirmed. The CARICOM institutions involved 
in the cases, the Community and the Council for Trade and Economic 
Development, also exhibited some displeasure with their presence before the 
 
European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121, 131 (1998). 
 102.  See Mikael R. Madsen, The Protracted Institutionalization of the Strasbourg Court: From Legal 
Diplomacy to Integrationist Jurisprudence, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS BETWEEN 
LAW AND POLITICS 44, 49–51 (Mikael R. Madsen & J. Christoffersen eds., 2011); Mikael R. Madson, 
Legal Diplomacy: Law, Politics and the Genesis of Postwar European Human Rights, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 62, 66 (Stefan-Lunwig Hoffman ed., 2011).  
 103.  Interviews n. 3 (Oct. 21, 2013); n. 10 (Oct. 23, 2013); n. 16 (Oct. 25, 2013); n. 15 (Oct. 24, 2013). 
 104.  Interviews n. 6 (Oct. 22, 2013); n. 19 (Oct. 26, 2013). 
 105.  TCL v. Guyana, App. No. AR 1 of 2008 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice 
[CCJ], ¶ 17 (Jan. 15, 2009). 
 106.  Interviews n. 6 (Oct. 22, 2013); n. 19 (Oct. 26, 2013). 
 107.  TCL v. Guyana, App. No. OA of 2009 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice 
[CCJ], ¶ 7 (Oct. 14, 2009). 
 108.  TCL v. Guyana, Application No. OA 2 of 2009 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of 
Justice [CCJ], ¶ 4 (Mar. 29, 2010). 
 109.  Justice Winston Anderson, Judge, Caribbean Court of Justice, Speech at the Regional 
Conference on “The Role of the Regional Courts in Strengthening Communitarian Law and Supra 
Nationality of the Process of Integration” (Jan. 30, 2014). 
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Court. Indeed, the Secretary-General of CARICOM showed up in person to 
observe the proceedings—an action that many viewed as symbolic defiance.110 
In conclusion, against the background of the TCL cases, it is clear the CCJ had 
only narrow authority in original jurisdiction proceedings at this stage. Cases 
were brought, and fought, mainly by a group of insiders to the system.111 
Particularly because of the actions of President Jagdeo of Guyana, however, the 
Court received media attention and caused other key players, notably the Prime 
Minister of Jamaica, to argue publicly in favor of the CCJ. This publicity 
empowered the Court by reference to its already successful practices under 
appellate jurisdiction. Against this backdrop, the expansion of the Court’s 
authority had only just begun. 
D. Broadening the Authority of the CCJ? 
In 2011, Humming Bird Rice Mills Ltd. filed cases against Suriname and the 
Community respectively.112 The company’s allegations resembled those raised 
by TCL—in fact, at the initial stage of the case the lawyer representing TCL 
had been consulted.113 The cases alleged an unjustified suspension of the CET 
granted by the Community to Suriname on flour imported from the 
Netherlands. The CCJ found that Suriname had breached the RTC, yet it once 
again dismissed claims for damages. Interestingly, these two cases indicate that 
the TCL cases had the effect of attracting similar cases. Similarly notable, more 
claimants, and not only insiders to the system, also started approaching the CCJ 
under original jurisdiction at this point. Of the five cases filed between 2011 and 
2014, two were filed by companies and three by individuals concerning their 
freedoms under the RTC.114 This slight but important change in the caseload 
 
 110.  Interview n. 11 (Oct. 23, 2013). 
 111.  In 2009, Doreen Johnson filed a labor-law case against the Caribbean Center for Development 
Administration. Johnson v. Caribbean Center for Development Administration, App. No. AR 2 of 
2008 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice [CCJ] (Mar. 2, 2009). We have not included 
this case in the evaluation of the initial authority of the CCJ because it is an internal case to the 
organization of the Community of little relevance to outsiders.  
 112.  The case led to three judgments: Hummingbird Rice Mills Limited v. Suriname, CCJ 
Application of No. OA 1 of 2011 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice [2011] CCJ 1 (OJ) 
(June 27, 2011); Hummingbird Rice Mills Limited v. Suriname, CCJ Application of No. OA 1 of 2011 
(Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice [2012] CCJ 1 (OJ) (Feb. 23, 2012); Hummingbird 
Rice Mills Limited v. Suriname, CCJ Application of No. OA 1 of 2011 (Original Jurisdiction), 
Caribbean Court of Justice [2012] CCJ 2 (OJ) (Apr. 11, 2012).  
 113.  Ultimately, two other lawyers—Mr. Elvis O’Connor and Ms. Linda Greene—argued the case. 
Interviews n. 17 (a) and (b) (Oct. 25, 2013).  
 114.  These were, in order of filing: Hummingbird Rice Mills Limited v. Suriname, CCJ Application 
of No. OA 1 of 2011 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice [2011] CCJ 1 (OJ) (June 27, 
2011); Myrie v. Barbados, App. No. OA 002 of 2012 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice 
[2012] CCJ 3 (OJ) (Sept. 27, 2012); Rudisa Beverages & Juices N.V. and Caribbean International 
Distributors Inc. v. The Co-operative Republic of Guyana, App. No. OA 003 of 2013 (Original 
Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice [2014] CCJ 1 (OJ) (May 8, 2014); Tomlinson v. Belize, App. 
No. OA 1 of 2013 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice [2014] CCJ 2 (OJ) (May 8, 2014); 
Tomlinson v. Trinidad & Tobago, App. No. OA 2 of 2013 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of 
Justice [2014] CCJ 2 (OJ) (May 8, 2014).   
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coincided with attempts to broaden CCJ authority. To analyze this 
development, this article analyzes the appointment of a new Court President, 
the landmark case of Myrie v. Barbados115 and its reception in the broader legal 
and political field in which the CCJ operates, and the three recent cases filed 
before the Court by individuals. 
These changes were spurred by the arrival of a new President to the Court. 
Whereas de la Bastide had been central to establishing the Court and its initial 
narrow authority in a highly complex legal and political environment, the new 
President, Sir Dennis Byron, sought to take the Court to new levels by widening 
the scope of its jurisdiction—notably with regard to individuals’ rights under the 
RTC.116 Like his predecessor, Byron’s professional trajectory represented the 
counter narrative to the post-colonial standard argument that locals could not 
provide the level of knowledge and experience of those lawyers trained in 
London. Not only had Byron established himself at the United Nations, but he 
had also established himself in the heart of post-colonial law: the Privy Council. 
Byron brought significant national and international judicial experience; he was 
former Chief Justice of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court and President of 
the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In addition to 
his significant judicial experience, Byron had the credentials of the old 
Caribbean legal elite. He graduated from Cambridge, was called to the bar of 
the Inner Temple before pursuing private practice with chambers in Saint Kitts 
& Nevis and Anguilla (1966–1982), and was appointed to the Privy Council in 
2004. Furthermore, Byron had also made a name for himself as a judicial 
reformer, both in the Caribbean and the Commonwealth, with a focus on ethics 
and case management. 
The Byron Court was offered an early chance to leave its mark on the CCJ 
in 2012, when Shanique Myrie, a Jamaican national, filed a case alleging that (1) 
the state of Barbados had violated her right to freedom of movement within the 
Community117 and (2) the behavior of the Barbadian border officers—who 
conducted a cavity search on her, detained her overnight in a cell at the airport 
in Bridgetown, and repeatedly insulted her—constituted a serious violation of 
her rights as a CARICOM citizen.118 Further fuel was added to the case when 
the Court granted Jamaica leave to intervene as a third party. CARICOM also 
intervened in the case, this time not as a defendant, but with a pro-Community 
and pro-CCJ attitude, which took Barbados by surprise. In deciding the case, 
the Court abandoned the constraining strategy of legal diplomacy consistent 
with the de la Bastide Court and instead adopted a more assertive line of 
argument aimed at expanding the CCJ’s jurisdiction and transforming 
 
    115.    Myrie, App. No. OA 002 of 2012 (Original Jurisdiction). 
 116.  Interview n. 1 (Oct. 21, 2013). 
 117.  As protected by the Article 45 RTC and by a Decision of the Conference of the Heads of 
Government of the Caribbean Community taken at their Twenty-Eighth Meeting (2007 Conference 
Decision).  
 118.  Myrie, App. No. OA 002 of 2012 (Original Jurisdiction), ¶ 2.  
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CARICOM from a mere collection of sovereign States to a united political 
community with an autonomous legal order.119 Thereby, the Myrie case offered 
an entrée for basic constitutional principles of European Union law into 
Caribbean law and politics. 
On the merits, the Court first found Barbados in violation of the RTC. It 
also ordered Barbados to pay compensation to Ms. Myrie as reparation for the 
breach of her right to freedom of movement, signaling for the first time the 
Court’s willingness to award damages under its original jurisdiction.120 Second, 
the Court employed well-crafted legal reasoning that resembled the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ to cement the Caribbean legal order by roughly 
establishing the principles of supremacy and the direct effect of CARICOM 
Community law. More specifically, the Court recognized the legal validity of the 
2007 Conference Decision, which was not formally part of the RTC and was not 
legislatively enacted by any of the member states.121 The CCJ’s reasoning 
echoed that of the ECJ in Costa v. Enel122 on the supremacy of Community law: 
The RTC . . . and more particularly the 2007 Conference Decision brought about a 
fundamental change in the legal landscape . . . . Although it is evident that a State with 
a dualist approach to international law sometimes may need to incorporate decisions 
taken under a treaty and thus enact them into municipal law in order to make them 
enforceable at the domestic level, it is inconceivable that such a transformation would 
be necessary in order to create binding rights and obligations at the Community 
level. . . . . If binding regional decisions can be invalidated at the Community level by 
the failure of the part of a particular State to incorporate those decisions locally the 
efficacy of the entire CARICOM regime is jeopardized and effectively the States 
would not have progressed beyond the pre-2001 voluntary system that was in force.
123
 
The Court’s reasoning thus equated the decisions of the Conference to the 
norms entrenched in the RTC. Consequently, the Court effectively created 
secondary legislation directly applicable at the Community level and 
hierarchically superior to national laws. 
Third, the Court came close to establishing a principle of direct effect using 
phrases resonant of the ECJ in Van Gend en Loos.124 The Court stated: “[T]he 
very idea and concept of a Community of States necessarily entails as an 
exercise of sovereignty the creation of a new legal order and certain self-
imposed, albeit perhaps relatively modest, limits to particular areas of State 
sovereignty.”125 Of course, one can argue that the CCJ’s interpretation of 
Caribbean Community law reflected here is mainly limited to the Community 
level and does not directly raise issues of domestic embeddedness in ways 
 
 119.   Id. ¶¶ 7–10. 
 120.  The Court, however, rejected the claims related to the violation of Ms. Myrie’s human rights 
for lack of jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 10.  
 121.  The Caribbean States follow the dualistic doctrine of international law, according to which 
international treaties have no effect domestically unless they are converted into national law by an act 
of the legislative branch.  
 122.  Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964  E.C.R. 585. 
 123.  Myrie, App. No. OA 002 of 2012 (Original Jurisdiction), ¶¶ 50–52. 
 124.  Case 26-62, Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland River Administration, 1963 E.C.R. 2. 
 125.  Myrie, App. No. OA 002 of 2012 (Original Jurisdiction), ¶ 69. 
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similar to European Union law. The CCJ’s direct effect doctrine is limited in 
applicability and follows from the binding nature of international law on states 
and the “correlative rights”126 it establishes for individuals. Although these 
rights can now be activated at the Community level when private litigants file 
suits directly with the CCJ, the Court has yet to make the rights directly 
enforceable by national judges. In other words, the contours of the framework 
are in place for an ECJ-style direct effect, but they have yet to be fully 
established.127 
What is probably more significant than the CCJ’s direct effect doctrine is the 
wide attention the Myrie case received in the public and in the legal field.128 The 
case strongly indicated the CCJ’s broadening authority and suggested that the 
CCJ was not simply another venue for large business but also a Court securing 
the rights of individual Caribbean citizens. As the title of an op-ed published in 
the wake of the CCJ’s Myrie decision read, “[the] Caribbean Court of Justice 
delivers for the Caribbean’s people.”129 
Particularly in Jamaica, the home country of Myrie, the case was promoted 
as support for ending the appeals to the JCPC, regardless of the fact that it did 
not concern appellate jurisdiction.130 In the Caribbean legal field more generally, 
the case also received attention. In a personal letter to the President of the CCJ, 
one of the Caribbean’s legal “dinosaurs” of the traditional transatlantic 
configuration applauded the decision’s overall quality and importance 
(although he also added that it violated basic principles of English international 
law). He wrote, 
[A] lot of thought must have been invested in the process to produce a judgment of a 
standard that we might all be proud of. It is not only meticulously prepared but 
extremely well-reasoned . . . I take positively the direction of the judgment as the most 
significant act of integration since the creation of the Federation.
131
 
Legal academia from the UWI campus equally mobilized in the wake of the 
case. In fact, Professor Berry, the leading authority on Community law and 
Dean of the UWI Law Faculty, had been part of the legal team that defended 
Barbados.132 Most notably, the case incited in academia a new stage of 
 
 126.  The CCJ established the principle of “correlative rights” in the case between TCL and 
Guyana. See supra note 75.  
 127.  Cf. BERRY, supra note 35, at 211.  
 128.  The newspaper “The Jamaican Observer” published a series of articles both to the case and to 
the subsequent difficulties of Ms. Myrie of getting her damages paid by Barbados. But all major 
newspapers have published news items on the matter. See Barbados Yet to Pay Shanique Myrie, 
JAMAICA OBSERVER (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Barbados-yet-to-pay-
Shanique-Myrie_15726998.  
 129.  Ronald Sanders, Caribbean Court of Justice Delivers for the Caribbean’s People, KAIETEUR 
NEWS (Jamaica) (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2013/10/13/caribbean-court-of-
justice-delivers-for-the-caribbeans-people/. 
 130.  A survey of online newspapers during the period finds similar arguments in a number of 
Caribbean countries.  
 131.  Interview n. 1 (Oct. 21, 2013). 
 132.  Myrie v. Barbados, App. No. OA 002 of 2012 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of 
Justice [2012] CCJ 3 (OJ) (Sept. 27, 2012); Interview n. 24 (Oct. 31, 2013). 
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scholarship on Caribbean law. Whereas earlier scholarship had been dominated 
by more promotional writings, Myrie inspired numerous conferences of a more 
empirical nature. The case also coincided with the 2014 publication by Professor 
Berry of the first manual on Caribbean integration law with Oxford University 
Press.133 This was yet another sign that this field of law was to be taken seriously. 
Above all, it is important to highlight that Barbados, although certainly not 
happy with the outcome of the case, did not explicitly challenge the authority of 
the Court. In an interview, the Attorney-General of Barbados stated that he 
disagreed only with the assessment of the facts conducted by the Court, not with 
the CCJ’s jurisdiction to decide the issue or the accuracy of the Court-
established principles.134 The Attorney-General noted, “[T]his is litigation. One 
time you lose, next time you win.”135 Moreover, after several months of false 
promises, delays, and discussions with the Jamaican authorities accompanied by 
numerous newspaper articles, Barbados eventually complied with the judgment 
and paid the damages granted to Myrie by the CCJ.136 However, closer scrutiny 
of government statements, particularly Trinidad & Tobago and Barbados in 
relation to the case—and the provocation of their Jamaican counterparts—
suggests that the intermediate authority of the CCJ is not a fait accompli. In 
fact, scorching remarks from one Trinidad & Tobago Minister in December 
2013 on the undesirability of Jamaicans in Trinidad caused significant uproar in 
the region and created an opposition between host and home countries of free 
movers, a problem well known to scholars of European integration.137 
The Myrie case marked the beginning of a wider acceptance of the CCJ as 
an authoritative adjudicator of Caribbean law particularly in the public and 
legal fields. Although the member states on the receiving end of free movement 
clearly stated their reservations, CARICOM had intervened for the first time in 
favor of a complainant. A different indicator of the broadening of authority 
provoked by Myrie was the arrival of several new cases to the Court—one on 
Community law filed by a company138 two on individual rights filed by a 
Jamaican citizen against Belize and Trinidad and Tobago,139and some politically 
sensitive appellate jurisdiction cases.140 In the Rudisa Beverages case, two 
 
 133. BERRY, supra note 35.  
 134.  Interview n. 28 (Nov. 6, 2013). 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Shanique Myrie Paid by Barbados Government, JAMAICA OBSERVER (June 24, 2014), 
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Shanique-Myrie-paid-by-Barbados-Government_16996057. 
 137. See, e.g., O’Leary Siofra, Free Movement of Persons and Services, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU 
LAW 499, 512–13  (Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca eds. 2011).  
 138.  Rudisa Beverages & Juices N.V. and Caribbean International Distributors Inc. v. The Co-
operative Republic of Guyana, App. No. OA 003 of 2013 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of 
Justice [2014] CCJ 1 (OJ) (May 8, 2014). 
 139.  Tomlinson v. Belize, App. No. OA 1 of 2013 (Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of 
Justice [2014] CCJ 2 (OJ) (May 8, 2014); Tomlinson v. Trinidad & Tobago, App. No. OA 2 of 2013 
(Original Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice [2014] CCJ 2 (OJ) (May 8, 2014).  
140.    British Caribbean Bank Ltd. v. Belize, App. No. CV 001 of 2013 (Appellate Jurisdiction), 
Caribbean Court of Justice [CCJ] (June 25, 2013); Raju Meenavalli v. Georgia and Janae Matute, App. 
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companies claimed that the imposition by Guyana of an environmental levy, or 
tax, on all nonreturnable beverage containers imported to that country 
constituted a violation of the RTC. In 2014, the CCJ decided on the merits of 
the case and, importantly, condemned Guyana to pay compensation to the two 
companies because it considered the imposition of those taxes contrary to the 
RTC.141 The two cases on fundamental rights are closely connected. In both, the 
applicant, Maurice Arnold Tomlinson, a Jamaican gay rights activist, seeks to 
strike down the Immigration Acts of both Belize and Trinidad & Tobago, which 
prohibit the entrance of homosexuals to their respective countries.142 The CCJ 
has granted leave in both cases and proceedings are pending.143 As concerns the 
appellate cases, it is worth mentioning the Maya Leaders Alliance et al. v. the 
Attorney General of Belize, a case dealing with a highly political and long-
lasting dispute related to land rights between the Government of Belize and 
some Mayan minorities. 
These new cases confirm the general trend of the Court’s broadening 
authority, a clear expansion beyond the initial narrow, litigant-specific 
authority. The Rudisa Beverages case confirms that the TCL was not a one-shot 
decision; TCL remains relevant to a pool of Pan-Caribbean companies that 
have an interest in the court as the primary enforcer of the RTC. Above all, this 
case signals the Court’s transition to a more liberal view on damages, a view 
which may have particular significance to private business litigants. 
The two Tomlinson cases equally indicate the Court’s emerging 
intermediate authority. According to interviewees, the cases are not simply an 
individual initiative but rather the result of an organized campaign on gay rights 
involving the Rights Advocacy Project of the Jamaican Faculty of Law of the 
UWI and Tomlinson himself as an activist and lawyer.144 The widening 
acceptance of the Court’s authority is further evidenced by the submissions for 
special leave by both Belize and Trinidad & Tobago in the Tomlinson cases. 
The two countries did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Court. To the 
contrary, they first recognized the binding principles on private access 
established by the Myrie case, and, secondly, they stated that the two contested 
Immigration Acts—although in principle prohibiting entry of homosexuals—are 
not applied in practice.145 The Court responded by granting leave, noting, in line 
with decisions from other human rights systems, that there is an arguable case 
because the mere existence of the legislative provisions in question amounts to 
 
No. CV 4 of 2012 (Appellate Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice [CCJ], (Apr. 10, 2014); The 
Maya Leaders Alliance et al. v. The Attorney General of Belize, App. No. BZCV2014/002 (Appellate 
Jurisdiction), Caribbean Court of Justice [CCJ], (Oct. 30, 2015). 
 141.  Rudisa Beverages, App. No. OA 003 of 2013 (Original Jurisdiction), ¶ 29. 
 142.  On May 8, 2014, he was granted leave by the CCJ, and the case is now proceeding. On the 
same day, the CCJ ruled in favor of Rudisa Beverages & Juices N.V. Caribbean International 
Distributors, Inc. and against Guyana. Id. 
 143.  Tomlinson, App. No. OA 1 of 2013 (Original Jurisdiction). 
 144.  Interview n. 12 (Oct. 24, 2013).  
 145.  Tomlinson, App. No. OA 1 of 2013 (Original Jurisdiction), ¶ 2.  
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prejudice.146  Although the two cases are therefore generally suggestive of the 
Court’s intermediate authority, the cases are also viewed by many as potentially 
explosive147 To these critics, the Court risks the reverse effect of a backlash 
because such a holding could potentially incite a clash of international human 
rights and local cultural sensitivities—a clash similar to the conflict over death 
row. Moreover, if the CCJ chooses to repel the domestic laws of Trinidad and 
Tobago and Belize, the Court is effectively establishing a power of judicial 
review that might come as a surprise to some of the member states. Finally, the 
Maya appellate case, in which the Court condemned Belize to pay 
BZ$300.000.00 for the violation of customary land tenure of some Mayan 
communities, reveals the ability and the willingness of the Court to present 
itself as the Court of Caribbean peoples and venture into questions of human 
and indigenous rights. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Although the total number of cases under the CCJ’s original jurisdiction 
remains very limited, these recent developments clearly suggest an evolution of 
the Court toward intermediate authority under the Alter, Helfer, and Madsen 
framework.148 Above all, this burgeoning of authority is indicated by the case-
flow, the broadening of the pool of applicants, and the broader popular interest 
in the CCJ that has expanded beyond the fields of law and politics. Following 
the key decisions on private access and state liability (TCL), the balanced 
handling of capital punishment (Joseph and Boyce), and the new jurisprudence 
on damages (Rudisa Beverages), Myrie added a further dimension to the small 
but evolving jurisprudence on Community law, which indicatively seems to 
continue in the recent Tomlinson cases. When considered in light of the Court’s 
protracted genesis and its background in two different and conflicting 
trajectories of Caribbean integration through law, the Myrie case created an 
intersectional constituency, one that, first, involves both citizens’ rights and the 
rights of private businesses and, second, enables the CCJ to bypass the social, 
legal, and political divisions that have long hampered Caribbean integration. 
This has also increasingly made the CCJ the “Caribbean peoples’ court”—a 
major development in and of itself considering the traditional elitist 
construction of law in the region. The CCJ’s recent direction suggests that it 
may seek to move toward an increasing convergence of its two different 
jurisdictions and operational contexts. Major judgments under the appellate 
jurisdiction are increasingly becoming regional news, an example being a recent 
case involving a malpractice lawsuit against a Belizean doctor,149 which is 
 
 146. Id. ¶ 6 (citing case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee).  
 147.  Interview n. 1 (Oct. 21, 2013).  
 148.  Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 7. 
 149.  Meenavalli v. Matute, App. No. CV 4 of 2012, Caribbean Court of Justice [2014] CCJ 8 (AJ) 
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strongly suggestive of this convergence.150 Moreover, the extensive authority of 
the CCJ under appellate jurisdiction—although such authority only applies to 
four countries—seems to fuel the overall authority of the Court. The recent 
Maya case is further evidence of that. 
Generally, indications of intermediate authority are in place, but the turn 
and mobilization of people—individual and corporate—should not overshadow 
the fact that many governments and legal professionals are still reluctant to 
engage the CCJ. Among legal and political elites, the transnational 
configuration of law—with the JCPC at the apex—is still widely popular and 
invoked to argue against accepting appellate jurisdiction. However, these elites 
generally have much less to add on original jurisdiction because they possess 
less expert knowledge in community law. The constitutional amendment 
procedures needed in some states for replacing the JCPC with the CCJ also 
make the transition to the CCJ very difficult. Ironically, while this situation of 
stalemate was cemented by the JCPC, that court’s judges have recently toured 
the Caribbean to discretely argue for abolition of appeals from the Caribbean 
to the JCPC. The English judges feel constrained by the Caribbean cases and 
seek to concentrate on the new U.K. Supreme Court.151 Jamaica and a number 
of smaller Caribbean states are also actively seeking to abolish the JCPC, which 
is equally indicative of the CCJ’s overall authority in the region. Moreover, 
notwithstanding reluctance in some countries, notably Trinidad & Tobago and 
Guyana, all states have so far taken meaningful steps toward the 
implementation of judgments against them. There is, however, a new split 
among the CARICOM member states on the issue of regional integration. 
While the more prosperous states such as Trinidad & Tobago and Barbados 
caution against being overrun by immigrants from the poorer states under free 
movement, states such as Jamaica have become very active defenders of the 
rights to free movement. These splits are potentially politically critical to further 
integration under CARICOM, but they do not, in light of this analysis, change 
the fact that the CCJ generally has intermediate authority. 
 
(Apr. 10, 2014). 
 150.  There is also a significant growth in the number of appellate cases. See CCJ Reports Increased 
Judgments in Appellate Jurisdiction, JAMAICA OBSERVER (June 25, 2014), http://www.jamaicaobserver 
.com/news/CCJ-reports-increased-judgments-in-appellate-jurisdiction_1699 8748. 
 151. Privy Council’s Complaint, BBC CARIBBEAN (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean 
/news/story/2009/09/090922_privyccjphillips.shtml.  
